This position has been maintained by the United Nations since April, 1952. Past treatment given repatriated nationals of communist countries convinced the leaders of the Western powers that Chinese and North Korean prisoners on their return would be exposed to deprivations of human rights. 6 Although U.N. leaders stated they would not retain prisoners who wished to return home, 6 they felt that repatriation by force would be inconsistent with the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention. To ascertain if force would be required to send prisoners home, the United Nations in April, 1952, screened captured Chinese and North Koreans. Interrogation showed that out of 170,000 captives only 70,000, or 40 percent, would not forcibly resist repatriation. 7 Openly expressed anti-communist feelings of many prisoners and the actual segregation of these captives after interrogation made it probable that home states would learn of their opposition to repatriation. The United Nations felt that this knowledge in the bands of communist governments increased the likelihood that many thousands of war captives would be subjected to severe deprivations. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, President Truman declared: "We must not use bayonets to force these prisoners to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands of the communists. ' '8 To use force, British Foreign Secretary Eden maintained, "would .. .be repugnant to the sense of values of the free world." (1952) .
5.
"The very fact of his captivity was the accusation leveled against every Soviet prisoner of war." DAILIN & NIcoLAEvsKY, FORcED LABoR IN SovInE RUSSIA 296 (1947) .
"In 1941 came the first convoys of Finns and detachments of Red Army soldiers who had been captured on the Finnish front; these soldiers had marched under a decorated triumphal arch in Leningrad, welcomed by streamers with the legend 'The Fatherland greets its heroes,' and to the strains of the Budyenny March had been led straight to a railroad siding beyond the town where sealed cattle trucks were waiting to take them to the [labor] camps." HERuNG, A WoRLD ApART 65-6 (Mentor ed. 1952) .
6. This very position was adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution, 427 (V) of December 14, 1950, which dealt with the detained World War II captives who "should .. .have been repatriated long since." The Resolution further stated: "(A]Il prisoners should . . .be given unrestricted opportunity of repatriation." YEuAnoo01' o All parties to the dispute have treated the issue of repatriation as a matter of international law alone. A member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations has declared: "The Chinese themselves and the Koreans themselves have demanded that repatriation shall take place in terms of international law. So far as we are concerned, therefore, this is common ground."
1 The General Assembly has agreed.' Its Resolution of December 3, 1952, stated: " [T] he release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the 'Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,' dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practices of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement.""'
For the purposes of this discussion it is not important whether this apparent respect for international law is genuine or motivated by a conviction that effective ideological warfare requires such an approach to the repatriation issue.
What is important is that the U.S.S.R., China, and North Korea have insisted that international law supports their stand, and have attacked the United Nations position as a flagrant violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Although discussed exclusively as a problem of legal doctrine, the disposition of Korean prisoners of war will, of course, be determined by political considerations growing out of the larger world-wide power struggle between the communist and non-communist worlds. Yet one source of strength in the Iorean controversy-and in the global conflict as well-lies in the ability of each of the major national governments to gain support for their policies from other nations and from their own citizens as well. Support for policies hinges on peoples' identifications; these, in turn, are shaped in part by conceptions of what is right and wrong.' 4 And the "right" and "wrong" of the Korean repatriation issue may well be linked by millions with the proper application of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Competing interpretatiton' of the Convention are thus important political weapons in the dispute over thv 10. Statement of the Representative of India, Mr. Menon, at the 525th Meeting of Committee I, Nov. 19, 1952 . U.S. DE=EG. Don US/A/C.l/2542, p. 7 (1952).
11. "The [General Assembly's] First Committee's general debate on the Korean question was concluded on November 24, exactly a month after it began. Fifty-three statements had been made at seventeen meetings. There were five draft resolutions-a joint 21-nation proposal, and those of the U.S.S.R., Mexico, Peru, and India." The Scarch for an Agreed Solution on Repatriatbig Korea Prisoners, 13 U.N. BmL. 4S7 (1952) . On the basis of these discussions Committee I passed a resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952. 12. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1952, p. 3, coL 1; Dec. 4, 1952, p. 3, col. 1. 13 . See, e.g., Statements of the Representative of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Vyshinsky, at the 514th Meeting of Committee I, Oct. 29, 1952, U.S. DEX.n. Doc. US/A/C.1/253S, p. 125 (1952); and at the 529th Meeting of Committee I, Nov. 24, 1952, U.S. DZLWr. Doc. US/A/C. 1/2543, pp. 2, 5 (1952) .
14. See McDougal, Law and Power, 46 Am J. INT'L L 102 (1952) .
Korean prisoners of war. Moreover, if the controversy's solution, however politically motivated, is consistent with a reasonable construction of international law, this consistency will help to further the United Nations' goal of a world order based on law.
No doctrinal analysis of specific Convention articles, however, has been advanced during the Korean debates by any statesman except one-the delegate from the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky. And because all nations concerned talk about the issue at least in general legal terms, because conceptions of right and wrong are significant sources of power, and because of the importance of establishing a world order based on law, a doctrinal analysis of the 1949 Geneva Convention is necessary. Such an inquiry must determine both the correct interpretation of pertinent treaty provisions and their application to specific factual situations, particularly the present Korean impasse. 12, 1949 12, , Art. 118 (1949 , provides in full:
"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
"In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
"In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
"The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned 10 To Mr. Vyshinsky the "literalist" view is the only one, the reflection of the "categoric formula," the "principle of international law."
'
To him the words of the Convention are compelling.
between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be carried out on the following basis:
"(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the pri-ners of var depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
-(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall hear the c,,sts of transport of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frntikr sir it; p rt of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisianers .,f war fpend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the oelitntle app ,rtionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement -'1al in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisuners of war."
The 
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They embody "the law." And a "law cannot be turned around like a cart in various directions and pulled hither and yon; it cannot be used as a shuttle- Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the Convention and by special agreements even if the enforcement of a right would be a deprivation for them.
The real issue is not whether or not the literalist view is "the law" and the United Nations position "an interpretation"; the issue is which interpretation is compatible with generally accepted modern principles of treaty interpretation. When decision makers interpret a treaty, they give its text meaning for a specific problem. 25 25. "Few terms of art may be said to exist in international law, and as the terms employed in international instruments seldom have an exact meaning, they can be interpreted only by giving content to them. This is not a matter of mechanical operation; it is not a process which performs itself automatically; results have to be kept in mind, judgment must be exercised, many factors must be appreciated" HUDSON, THE PEaMA-NENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920 -1942 , pp. 641-2 (1943 "A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it is intended to serve. This historical background of the treaty, travaux pr paratoires, the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve. ' Co
Convention Purposes
Few treaties exist whose major purposes are as obvious as those of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Delegates to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference characterized their work as "inspired solely by humanitarian aims." 2 ' The Convention itself it designed for the "protection" of prisoners of war.
2 2 The text provides that prisoners of war must be protected against violence or intimidation and humanely treated "at all times." 33 They are to be spared insults to their dignity as human beings. 34 
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or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. 35 , Provisions governing repatriation, like all other parts of the Convention, must be viewed in the light of these purposes. 30 By recalling the climate of opinion existing after World War II, one can appreciate the Drafters' deep commitment to humanitarian principles. The Convention was written during a period of increasing awareness that the protection and promotion of human rights are intimately associated with the conditions necessary to secure permanent peace. The Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Draft Covenants of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, as well as the 1946 General Assemby Resolution on Refugees, all indicate that awareness. The so-called "literalist" interpretation fails to consider as significant this concern which is expressed in the purposes of the Convention and in its legislative history as well.
Legislative History: Convention Conferences
The genesis of the Convention as recorded shows that the words of Article 118 represent an attempt to imp rove upon Article 75 of the 1929 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of Vrar in the light of the experience of World War 11. 37 Article 75 of the 1929 Convention provided that in the event of an armistice, belligerents "in principle" were obligated to "have appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war." If belligerents made no such stipulations, then they were to conclude a repatriation agreement "as soon as possible." "In any case," however, repatriation was to be effected "with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace." '38 Under a literal interpretation of the 1929 Convention, detaining 35. Id. at Art. 13.
36. In addition to its purposes a decision-maker when interpreting should also conxsider the legislative history of the treaty, general principles of international law and the conditions prevailing at the time the interpretation is being made. See McDougal & Gardner, supra note 22, at 266 et seq.; and see also text at pages 396-7 supra.
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE TREATmENT OF PISONERS OF WAR, 27
JuLy 1929, Art. 75 (1929) . 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATmENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, 27
JuLy 1929, Art. 75 (1929) reads in full:
"When belligerents conclude a convention of armistice, they must, in principle, have appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war. If it has not [Vol. 62:391 powers, on the pretext of complying with the letter of Article 75, could rationalize their retention of prisoners until peace treaties were signed.
9 And World War II experience showed that final settlements between belligerents--peace treaties or unilateral declarations-often are delayed for many years after hostilities end or perhaps indefinitely. 40 To prevent the detention of prisoners long after any apparent military reason for their captivity remained was a major reason for the "categorical" language of Article 118 of the 1949 Convention. 41 Article 118 attempted to improve on Article 75 of the 1929 Convention, by introducing a definite time--"after the cessation of hostilities" -when detaining powers are obligated to repatriate prisoners of war. What was not changed was the nature of the obligation itself.-At the Conference of Government Experts, which met at Geneva in 1947 to consider International Red Cross proposals for a new convention, World been possible to insert stipulations in this regard in such convention, belligerents shall nevertheless come to an agreement in this regard as soon as possible. In any case, repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace.
"Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution might be pending for a crime or an offense of municipal law may, however, be detained until the end of the proceedings and, if necessary, until the expiration of the punishment. The same shall be true of those sentenced for a crime or offense of municipal law.
"On agreement between the belligerents, commissions may be established for the purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners and assuring their repatriation." 39. The Russians, for instance, might claim even seven years after the end of hostilities that they are not obligated under international law to return Japanese and German prisoners of xwar still under their control because they have not concluded treaties of peace with Germany and Japan.
40. The Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded at San Francisco, Sept. PRISON (1951) .
45. At the request of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the question of the "failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war detained in Soviet territory" was placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The complaint was considered for many months by two committees of the General Assembly. YEARnoo OF THE UNim NATIo Ns-1950 Ns- , p. 564 (1951 . A resolution (427(V)) of December 14, 1950, adopted at the 325th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, set up an ad hoc committee to investigate the matter of "missing" prisoners of war. Id. at 568. It was asserted in this resolution "that all prisoners having originally come within the control of the Allied Powers as a consequence of the Second World War should either have been repatriated long since or have been otherwise accounted for." U.N. Doe. A/1749, p. 1 (1950) . Russia has consistently refused to cooperate with this committee, which was established "with a view to settling the question of the prisoners of war in a purely humanitarian spirit," although the committee has attempted to be as conciliatory as pos. sible in order to reach a solution "on terms acceptable to all the governments concerned." Note, 5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATiON 728 (1951).
[Vol. 62:391 repatriated without being offered a choice; nor did they claim that they should be given one. The Red Cross also reported to the Delegates that "[lit happened fairly often [after World War II that POW were repatriated against their will. This led to numerous suicides, as POW were sometimes afraid, with or without valid reason, to return home." 40 These forced repatriations were discussed by the Delegates, but not condemned. For those prisoners of war who were returned home against their will were repatriated to territory under allied control where no threat to their basic human rights existed. 47 Some states, however, did base repatriation on prisoners' choice. After World War II, England and France needed manpower and gave enemy prisoners of war under their control the alternative of returning home or remaining. 48 And the Russians announced that certain enemy soldiers could choose whether they wished to remain in Russia, 46. Geneva Convention of J., 27, 1929, relativi 51, 75 (1946) .
The only recorded case in the United States of a prisoner insisting that he should not be repatriated is that of Mario D'Elia, an Italian prisoner of war. The Department of the Judge Advocate General of the Army recognized that Art. 75 of the 1929 Geneva Convention did not require that D'Elia be repatriated against his wishes, and that whether or not he should be allowed to remain in the United States was a question of policy. return home, or go elsewhere. 49 As an inducement to surrender, the Soviet commander at Stalingrad guaranteed officers and soldiers the choice of returning after the war to Germany "or to any other country where the prisoner of war should desire to go." 5° At Budapest the Russians made a similar proposal.
MALEMORANDUM FOR THE JuDGE ADvocATE
5 '
Although aware of this variety of practices, the Government Experts preferred to frame a general repatriation article, rather than provide in detail for specific problems that might arise.
5 2 The Rapporteur invited discussion on whether the Conference wished to prohibit a detaining power from repatriating unwilling prisoners, but none was forthcoming; no proposals were made.r 3 The Experts feared that detaining powers, under the guise of compliance with a provision making exceptions to repatriation, might prevent captives from returning home. General Bryan, the American delegate, warned that "if we allow escape clauses in this article, we risk reducing the [repatriation] "He urged that no Detaining Power should be comnpdlcd to keep in its territory prisoners of war who did not wish to return home. It might even be dangerous particularly for small States, to retain too large a number of prisoners in their territory. He was certain that if a prisoner produced valid reasons for refusing repatriation (for instance, danger of death in the event of returning to his own country), no camp commandant would repatriate him against his will, at least in Canada."
60
The Delegates also rejected the further suggestion that the repatriation articles expressly should grant detaining powers an option to accede or not to prisoners' requests to avoid repatriation. 1 ' Apart from previously mentioned objections to "escape clauses" by the Government Experts, the Delegates felt such an express option might create the unjustified exp2ctation in prisoners that they could claim asylum as a right. But British and French representatives at the Diplomatic Conference felt strongly that the Convention should not alter the established doctrine and practices of asylum. Although, at the time, the wording of another article was under discussion, the statements of these representatives were apparently applicable to all repatriation situations. The traditional discretion of nation states to grant or withhold asylum, they declared, was not to be impaired.
2 Available evidence does not indicate that these declarations were contradicted.
One episode in the legislative history of Article 118 deserves special mention because of the emphasis Mr. Vyshinsky has placed upon it 0 and because it represents the only occasion on which a non-repatriation proposal came to a vote. The rejection by the Diplomatic Conference of the Austrian proposal that "prisoners of war must have the option of not returning to their country if they so desire'6 has been cited as conclusive proof that Article 109, the U.K. representative, Mr. Gardiner, stated: "I suggest that a country should ba allowed to decide for itself whether it will give refuge and asylum to a foreigner who has ccme to that country not by a voluntary act of his own; for instance, when a Detainitig Power is Eatisfied that he has good grounds for staying, but there should not be an obligation on the Detaining Power to keep a prisoner of war.. .. " Id. at 313. M. Lamarle of France supported Mr. Gardiner: "Moreover, as the United Kingdom Delegate pointed out, no question of any kind of right of sanctuary arises.... It is natural, however, or at least it seems natural to me... that the Detaining Power should reserve its own discretion. This would of course not prevent it from taking account of any circumstances which seemed to merit consideration." Id. at 314.
63. See Vyshinsky's statement, U.S. DELEG., op. cit. sutra note 14, at S. "Subject to the provisions of the following paragraph, prisoners of war shall be repatriated to the country whose nationals they are at the time of their repatriation.
I-A FiNAL
"Prisoners of war, however, shall be entitled to apply for their transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them." ' This amendment was rejected by a "large majority.
1 ' 7 Both the Russian and the American delegates voted against it. 68 The Delegates seem to have defeated the amendment decisively for the same reasons they had not included in Article 118 either an obligation or an express option to grant asylum. First, General Sklyarov presented the official Russian position when he expressed his fear "that a prisoner of war might not be able to express himself with complete freedom when he was in captivity." He further claimed that such a "provision might give rise to the exercise of undue pressure on the part of the Detaining Power." ' 9 Russian desire to avoid escape clauses may also have reflected her fear that in the event of a future conflict many captured Russian soldiers would not return home if given a choice. 70 The American delegation was concerned lest such a clause might tempt detaining powers in a future war to force American captives to state that they do not wish repatriation. 71 Thus one reason for rejection was the desire not to give an escape clause the sanction of treaty words. But a second, and more compelling reason for rejection seems to stem from the actual language of the Austrian proposal. The clear implication of the amendment was that it imposed on the captor country an obligation to grant at least temporary asylum, and that it entitled the prisoners to demand transfer to a third country. At an earlier stage of the Conference, the Delegates had found such an obligation objectionable. And Mr. Gardiner, the British delegate, [Vol. 62:391 felt the Austrian proposal further obliged captors to accede to prisoners' demands for transfer to a third country.
72 Because these were the reasons for rejection, defeat of the Austrian proposal provides no support for the position that Article 118 requires repatriation of each and every prisoner.
Thus nothing exists in the text of the 1949 Geneva Convention or in the record of the conferences preceding it to indicate that states were meant to be prohibited from granting asylum to prisoners of war. And in the light of the variety of World War II repatriation practices, it is clear that the Delegates assumed that offering asylum was compatible with the new repatriation article and general international law.
Article 118 recognizes that the paramount desire of prisoners of war is "to be returned as quickly as possible to the sphere of their national activities." 73-Since for most prisoners failure to be returned would be a major deprivation, repatriation is protected as a "right." And Articles 6 and 7 protect "rights" established by the Convention. Article 6 7 forbids governments concerned from bargaining away "rights" of prisoners; Article 7 restrains war prisoners themselves from doing so. If, however, a prisoner opposes repatriation and it is deemed that returning him will endanger his life, liberty or dignity, to say that a man loses a "right" by not being forced home under such circumstances is strange doctrine indeed. It is proper for a home state to insist that "rights" of prisoners guaranteed under the Convention be honored. If repatriation, however, would amount to a denial of human rights, a home state's insistence that its nationals be returned, based on a claim that it is protecting a right, should not be honored. For forcible repatriation under these circumstances would represent a perversion of the purposes of the entire Convention.
Legislative History: International Law Doctrite and Practice
Article 118 was drafted to set forth clearly and unequivocally a right to be repatriated. Articles 6 and 7 were included to protect that right and others. But the records of the proceedings further show the desire of the Convention AUGUST 12, 1949 , Art. 6 (1949 reads: "In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 109, 110. 118, 119, 122 and 132,  the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for all matters cncerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
"Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable ra sures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict."
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drafters not to discard, but rather to implement, relevant general doctrines and practices of international law, 5 in existence long before 1949.
The most comprehensive statement of these principles is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 70 The Declaration affirms a "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person" without which achievement of long-range United Nations goals, as mapped by the Charter, would be impossible. 77 The United Nations interpretation of the 1949 Convention is consistent with fundamental individual rights set out in the Declaration. A right to be repatriated is a specific application of the right "to leave any country and to . . . return to [it]" (Art. 13(2)) and not to "be arbitrarily deprived of ... nationality" (Art. 15 (2)). Article 9 of the Declaration-"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary . . . detention or exile" -buttresses the position that Article 118 prohibits captors from forcibly retaining prisoners of war. These principles as well as the words of Article 118 provide strong support for the proposition that a prisoner's desire to be repatriated must be honored. But the right to "life, liberty and the security of person" (Art. 3), the right not to be subjected to "slavery or servitude" (Art. 4), the right not to "be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Art. 5), the right "to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" (Art. 14, § 1)-these rights would be denied if prisoners were repatriated by force to slave labor camps or firing squads.
Principles of the Universal Declaration have been recognized in traditional international law. States have protected human rights by granting asylum, long an international institution. 8 The United States throughout her history has exercised the right to grant asylum. 7 0 Moreover, she has consistently 75 . See 394-428 (1950) .
77.
One of the aims of the United Nations is to act so as "to reaffirm falth in funda. mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." U.N. CHARTER Preamble. One of its purposes is to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all...
Id. 266, 274 (1950) .
The asylum referred to in the text is not the controversial "diplomatic asylum," Aug. 20, 1952, p. 3, col. 7; Sept. 19, 1952, p. 3, col. 5. (Vol. 62.3 91
REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WFAR
refused to extradite aliens likely to face persecution. 80 Constitutions of the Soviet Union and many of her satellites proclaim that "those persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation" have a right of asylum within these countries. 81 Constitutions of certain western nations extend a right of asylum to those persecuted for "political" reasons.
8 2 Most states, however, do not extend asylum as a right.83 These disparate views conform to general international law, which holds that on the question of refusing to admit or expel aliens the state is sovereign.
4 By invoking asylum a captor can thus justify its refusal to repatriate prisoners of war whose rights might be violated if they are forced to return. Mr. Vryshinsky argues that prisoners have no right to seek and enjoy a grant of territorial asylum, because of their special status as soldiers of their nation-states. " [T] hey are bound by the oath of loyalty which they gave their fatherlands; . . . they remain bound by their duty as soldiers to their fatherlands, their armies." '' s No authority is offered for this innovation, and there is no justification for discriminating against soldiers in such a manner. For this thinking contradicts a fundamental premise of all human rights: equal treatment for all regardless of status. Furthermore, in practice, states have given protection to prisoners of war who have not wished repatriation.
0 Most post-World War I peace treaties and repatriation agreements permitted prisoners to remain in the territory of their captor. 330-6 (1927) .
88. This essentially is the communist position. See text at page 391 supra.
89.
Although in principle a nation-state can do with its nationals what it wishes, the doctrine and practices of "humanitarian intervention" indicate that there are limits to that discretion. When a state treats its nationals in such a way as to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity may be legally permissible [Vol. 62:391 with such a rule where prisoners' human rights might be violated. The United Nations Charter has not abolished "humanitarian intervention"; the Charter merely prohibits interference "in matters which essentially are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 0 0 If there is widespread denial of basic human rights, a state cannot invoke domestic jurisdiction despite the fact that the violations occur within the state's own territory and are imposed on its nationals. By authorizing a three-man commission to investigate race policies of Prime Minister Malan's South African government, the United Nations recognized that a state's attack on the basic human rights of its citizens threatens peace and therefore is a matter of international, not domestic concern.
91 Refusal to repatriate prisoners of war in the name of human rights resembles humanitarian intervention, but the two are not identical since this Rav. 193, 203-5 (1952 
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The literalist view that repatriation of all prisoners is mandatory disregards the purposes and history of the 1949 Geneva Convention and the need to refer to conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is made. But does the proper method of treaty interpretation obligate a state to grant asylum, or does it make refusal to repatriate merely a matter of discretion? Though those who framed the Convention followed the traditional doctrine of asylum by rejecting the suggestion that asylum should be obligatory, what they opposed was a general obligation-asylum for all prisoners under all circumstances. In the light of the mandatory provision of the Convention that "prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated," 9 3 an obligation to grant asylum does exist when repatriation would result in deprivation of human rights and where the prisoner has supplied convincing evidence that in his case there is no justification for the Convention's assumption that the paramount desire of a prisoner is to go home. Thus detaining powers must not repatriate prisoners of war if (a) it is reasonable to conclude that they would be deprived of fundamental human rights upon return; and (b) if the prisoner himself opposes repatriation so strongly that it could be effected only by using force.
APPLYING THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION
After one accepts the correct interpretation of the repatriation provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, as the U.N. has done, the problem of application remains. The United Nations, or any future decision-maker must answer, at least by implication, these questions: What standards should be used to judge whether treatment of repatriated prisoners by the home state represents a denial of human rights? In a given situation does available evidence give reason to believe that upon repatriation prisoners would receive treatment constituting such a denial? And finally, does a prisoner of war oppose repatriation so strongly that he can be sent home only by using force?
Establishing Standards
All members of the United Nations accept certain human rights. They have agreed to the general formulae contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as the provision that no one shall be subjected to "slavery or servitude" or "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 9D4 Since the communist and non-communist worlds exhibit fundamental disagreement as to what kinds of state practices must be characterized as "slavery" or "inhuman treatment," it is not now possible to articulate shared a priori standards. An illustration of this impasse is found in the failure of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations to draw up generally 5 When disagreement exists, however, specific meaning can still be given to general formulae by a series of authoritative decisions or shared practices. For example, general concepts of the 14th Amendment have been given specific content with respect to civil rights only after decades of judicial construction. Similarly, specific standards for general formulae of human rights may one day emerge from international, and particularly United Nations, practices and decisions. But e::isting inchoate standards could not serve as a reliable guide to the United Nations at the time it applied the 1949 Convention to Korea. The General Assembly avoided setting forth specific standards by which the world could judge whether the treatment accorded repatriated prisoners would represent a denial of human rights. The Resolution of December 3, 1952, presented as a basis for settlement of the prisoner problem, held only that "force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and no violence to their dignity or self-respect shall he permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever." 0 But since, by itself, employment of force to effect repatriation has never been considered a violation of human rights, the position taken by the United Nations Command and the General Assembly must have been based on a tacit assumption that prisoners forced to return would be exposed to deprivations. This assumption was made articulate only by leaders of the United States and Britain, who stressed that human rights are violated if repatriated prisoners are committed to forced labor camps or executed arbitrarilyY Although Western values, not general international agreement, underlie the United Nations repatriation proposals, to have spelled out even these standards in the December Resolution would have filled a real need in international law.
Finding the Facts
Application of the 1949 Geneva Convention requires a factual determination of the treatment which awaits repatriated prisoners of war. Decisions on repatriation should be made with express reference to facts found through 95. At the eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights t,,o draft covenants, one on "Civil and Political Rights," and the other on "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," were prepared. As yet they have not been accepted. 
97.
In a speech at Guildhall, London on November 10, 1952, Prime Minister Churchill declared: "It would be dishonour to send thousands of helpless prisoners of war back by force to be massacred by a Chinese Communist Government which boasts that it has actually rid itself of two millions of its own people." The Times, Nov. 11, 1952, p. 6, col. 6. See also President Truman's statement, text at page 392, supra.
importance of the decision about to be made by the prisoner and its possible adverse effects on his family at home. Full publicity was given to communist assurances of amnesty to all prisoners regardless of their conduct while captives of the United Nations.' 0 ' An interviewer questioned each person separately. Koreans were interrogated by South Korean civilians under the general supervision of United States personnel, while the Chinese were screened by Chinese spealing United States servicemen. 0 2 On the basis of a prisoner's answers to specific questions,' 0 2 the United Nations predicted whether or not force would be necessary to effect his return. Unless answers indicated the person would commit suicide, escape, fight to the death, or take other desperate measures to avoid repatriation, the individual vas placed on the list of those who were to be sent home.0-1 It is possible that these tests of a prisoner's opposition were even stricter than might be necessary to show that force would be needed to effect repatriation.
This screening process was attacked in the United Nations by Mr. Vyshinsky. He argued that the April screening, or any other interrogation of war captives, even under the most ideal conditions, could not be free of coercion.
" [T] hey [the supporters of the United Nations position] completely ignore the simple and elementary idea that under conditions of war imprisonment there is not and cannot be the most minimum conditions for the free expression of the will of any war prisoner."'10
But those who drafted the 1949 Geneva Convention-Russians among them -assumed that a free expression of will under conditions of war imprisonment is possible, for Article 109 of the Convention provides that a sick or wounded prisoner eligible to be sent home is not to be "repatriated against his will during hostilities." Perhaps the United Nations might have avoided some attacks on the screening process if it had delegated the interrogation to a 
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neutral nation or organization. But even the Repatriation Commission, proposed in the December Resolution of the General Assembly, might be charged with bias. For in a bi-polar world it is difficult to find an organization or state not exposed to accusations of partiality. 08 Thus many belligerents might refuse to apply the correct interpretation of the Convention if the obligation not to repatriate were to involve a further obligation to provide a permanent home for displaced prisoners. After World War II the responsibility for the care and resettlement of displaced persons was declared to be a matter of international concern.
1 9 Similarly, the burden of providing for non-repatriated prisoners of war should not be placed on detaining powers alone, but rather on some international organization. Shifting the responsibility in this fashion would ease the fear expressed at the 1949 Geneva Conference that a grant of asylum will impose immense burdens on captor states. Though the postWorld War II agencies for the care of refugees-UNRRA and IRO-have been disbanded, the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees 110 might be entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for non-repatriable prisoners of the Korean conflict or future wars. The United Nations Resolution of December 3, 1952, calls upon a post-armistice "political conference" to arrange for the disposition of unrepatriated Korean captives. If this conference cannot solve the problem within 30 days, the responsibility is to devolve upon the United Nations."' But whatever organization is assigned this 106. Witness the current attacks being leveled at the International Red Cross. These reached their height at the July, 1952, International Red Cross Conference. As a result "the first serious pessimism regarding the future of the Red Cross had begun to preoccupy many of the delegates." N.Y. 110. For a discussion of his functions see YEARBOox OF THE UNITED NATioNS-1950, p. 21 (1951) .
111. "At the end of ninety days, after the armistice agreement has been signed, the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target [Vol. 62:391 problem, the solution reached must provide a brighter future than the one from which the United Nations offers refuge.
A NEW POINT OF DEPARTURE
That international law should govern the Korean repatriation issue is the common ground on which the communists and the United Nations stand. Disagreement results from conflicting views of what the 1949 Geneva Convention provides for the Korean situation. Claiming that its position is "wholly consistent with" the Convention, and required by its general humanitarian principles, the United Nations holds that no prisoner will be forcibly repatriated. The communists insist that Article 118, read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 7, embodies "the law" and requires that all captives, without exception, be repatriated. However, Article 118, in which Mr. Vyshinsky finds his "categoric formula," is directly applicable only "after cessation of hostilities." These words were used to characterize a situation where no military reason could justify the continued captivity of prisoners. The actions and attitudes of both parties, however, indicate that the situation characterized in Article 118 will not result from the conclusion of an armistice. The Russians themselves have said the cold war will continue. And concern over defensible cease-fire lines and the rate of troop rotation during the negotiations seems to indicate both parties believe military needs will be paramount even after an armistice is concluded. Perhaps, then, through a fresh appraisal of the facts, the communists and the United Nations can agree on a repatriation formula based on another provision of the Convention. Article 109 might serve this purpose. This article is designed to encourage exchange of prisoners when the conditions referred to in Article 118 are not present. Article 109, in part, provides that during hostilities, "Parties ...may . . . conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of... prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity." This provision contains nothing which can be construed as a "categoric formula." Thus a state need not feel compelled by Convention language to insist upon the repatriation of all prisoners without exception.
1n many disputes the re-examination of the factual premises on which seemingly irreconcilable positions are based has opened new avenues to honorable agreement. Yet even if the United Nations and the communists should re-examine their positions, any agreement which might result must preserve and promote the humanitarian purposes of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
date for the termination of their detention, to the political confereuce to be called as provided uuder Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further thirty days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected or provided for by the political conference the responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention shall be transferred to the United Nations." N.Y.
